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A Phenomenology of Home 
Jean Améry on Homesickness 
Martin Shuster 
Goucher College 
As the contemporary nation state order continues to produce genocide and 
destruction,1 and thereby refugees, and as the national and international 
landscape continues to see the existence of refugees as a political problem, 
Jean Améry’s 1966 essay “How Much Home Does a Person Need?” takes on 
a curious urgency. I say ‘curious’ because his own conclusions about the 
essay’s aims and accomplishments appear uncertain and oftentimes unclear 
(note how Améry himself surprisingly suggests that his remarks will have 
“little general validity” – a statement that will need to be properly situated).2 
My aim in what follows, then, is twofold. First, I intend to make clear the 
rich, suggestive, but perhaps underdeveloped phenomenological 
assumptions involved in this essay. Second, I want to show—but, 
unfortunately, only show—how these assumptions and Améry’s analysis 
points to a problem at the heart of contemporary conceptions of statehood, 
one which demands significantly more discussion. 
Notions of ‘home’ and ‘homesickness’ have had a prominent place in 
philosophy, especially from Kant onwards, even more so in 
phenomenology.3 In many ways, it is obvious that Améry stands in this 
tradition with this essay, although he is not invoking (and indeed, despite 
his affinity for Sartre’s work, likely not familiar with) these debates in any 
detailed or scholarly fashion. His approach will be reflected in my own, 
where my aims will be to fill in some of the phenomenological details, but 
not to engage the various phenomenological debates in any robust fashion.  
As mentioned, Améry takes himself to be writing in a sort of 
autobiographical mode of reportage, where “little general validity” is to be 
drawn from his account. This point, however, is immediately tempered by 
his suggestion that the homesickness (Heimweh) he is describing is “totally 
new and not determined by any conventional emotions recorded in 
literature” (H 50). It strikes me as most helpful to see Améry’s claim about 
‘general validity’ as oriented around the thought that his remarks are not 
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meant to reveal something about what it means to be a refugee – his account 
is not pitched at that level of generality, for that would merely be an 
autobiographical account. Instead, Améry is concerned with a distinct sort 
of—according to him: radically new—homesickness, one that he certainly 
experienced, but one which requires a particular analysis. This is one way to 
understand why Améry’s account is not solely or merely autobiographical 
(hence my use of ‘sort of autobiographical’ above): it is a form of 
phenomenological analysis, where there is an important difference between 
“the object of knowledge and the act of knowing.”4 In other words, what 
interests Améry is not the psychological state of homesickness, but rather 
something like the ontological quality of homesickness: that human 
subjectivity becomes a certain way under certain conditions. These 
conditions themselves are historical—contingent—but the deformations of 
subjectivity that they engender are not; those will apply generally to all who 
undergo these conditions.5 Yet not all refugees do undergo these conditions, 
and thus Améry’s hedging about general applicability. This, at least, is the 
sort of inflection and stress I put on his claim that, “my, our homesickness 
was alienation (Selbstentfremdung) from the self” (H 43). What is the nature 
of this homesickness? 
 
Homesickness: Self and World  
Initially, it is easiest to answer this question by pointing out what is not 
homesickness. It is not the sort of homesickness one feels when one chooses 
exile from a country with which one presently disagrees. In such a case, this 
is still one’s country—one might return (H 42-43, see especially the joke 
about Remarque on 43). Similarly, it is no sort of self-pity or reminiscence or 
nostalgia (H 51), where one pines for the way things were (or even how one 
thinks they were). What Améry is after is none of these psychological 
phenomena, or indeed any other strictly psychological phenomenon. 
Instead, the sort of homesickness he describes revolves around losing one’s 
self (see especially the discussion of self-destruction and loss of self at H 
51ff), a self that Améry implies depends on having a sense of temporality (H 
44-45, 57, 58-59), a distinct and unique name (H 45), mastery of and within 
one’s own language (H 48, 52-53), and bodily stability and security (H 46). 
 The loss of self that Améry is referencing here is a loss of world. It is 
this unstated premise that deserves some discussion. First, it ought to be 
made clear how exactly ‘world’ and ‘self’ might be taken to hang together, to 
depend on one another. Second, it ought to be underscored how exactly 
when one loses the former, one loses the latter. Although both points have 
been made by philosophers as diverse as Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, and 
Wittgenstein, neither point is immediately obvious (or at least it hasn’t been 
to a large swathe of philosophical interlocutors). Améry writes that: 
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Home is security (Sicherheit), I say. At home we are in full 
command of the dialectic of familiarity (kennen) and recognition 
(erkennen), of trust and confidence: since we are acquainted (kennen) 
with our surroundings, we recognize (erkennen) them, and they 
dare us to speak and act--we have justified confidence in our 
proficiency (Kenntnis) and insight (Erkenntnis) (H 47, translation 
modified). 
Note how the orientation is thoroughly phenomenological, where the focus 
is on our practical engagement with the world as opposed to any theoretical 
understanding or knowledge of it (flag, then, the use of ‘kennen’ as opposed 
to ‘wissen’). One can compare this to the sort of conceptualizations of ‘being-
in-the-world’ that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (and likely Husserl) 
pursued,6 where “the main areas of my body are devoted to actions, and 
participate in their value…but [also where] our body is not merely one 
expressive space among the rest…[but] is the origin of the rest…that which 
causes them to begin to exist as things.”7 In other words, we are 
fundamentally embodied creatures who exist—via our bodily existence and 
comportment—in a word of significance and salience, a world, one might 
say, of “affordances.”8 Home, on this view, and in the words of one 
commentator on Merleau-Ponty, is a “second body.”9 The body exists, 
allowing one the (a) world; it finds itself already always immersed and 
embedded in particular practical projects of “absorbed coping.”10 The home, 
then, taken in this expressive sense, is exactly a sort of second body, in that it 
allows one to pursue one’s projects, extending one’s lines of salience and 
one’s possibilities for action, giving them a necessary qualitative nexus of 
stability and, importantly, security. Take this passage from Phenomenology of 
Perception: 
I arrive in a village for my holidays, happy to leave my work and 
my everyday surroundings. I settle in the village, and it becomes 
the centre of my life. The low level of the river, gathering in the 
maize crop or nutting are events for me. But if a friend comes to see 
me bringing news from Paris, or if the press and radio tell me that war 
threatens, I feel an exile in the village, shut off from real life, pushed 
far away from everything. Our body and our perception always 
summon us to take as the centre of the world that environment 
with which they present us. But this environment is not necessarily 
that of our own life. I can ‘be somewhere else’ while staying here, and 
if I am kept far away from what I love, I feel out of touch with real 
life.11 
Améry’s focus is exactly on this feeling of being ‘out of touch.’ 
 And this is why he describes various ways one might mitigate this (H 
44). If one possesses religion, one might feel ‘at home’ in this way in a 
variety of ways: from seeing something divine everywhere to feeling the 
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presence of God with one to understanding that whatever one is currently 
experiencing is part of some divine plan (just to give some examples). 
Similarly, with money, one is able to purchase a sort of security and stability 
that one might otherwise not have, indeed, one might feel as if the whole 
world – all of its regions, no matter how broad spatially – are yours (for 
better and for worse, depending). With money, one doesn’t feel ‘out of 
touch,’ exactly because money gives one a surrogate touch, in the form of 
those one might hire, e.g., in the form of possible minions that extend one’s 
reach and one’s comfort, extend one’s home. The same is true, by differing 
but related mechanisms, of fame. And, yet, to all of these—as stories from 
the Nazi genocide (and others) persistently demonstrate—there are limits 
and exceptions. These are, at best, substitutes for home, for feeling ‘in touch,’ 
for safety.  
 Involved in this sense of safety is above all a bodily integrity (H 46), 
since that is the point of origin with respect to one’s being-in-the-world.12 
One’s self—whatever else it might undertake or perform—requires a body 
already always involved in and thoroughly saturated by a variety of 
comportments, saliencies, and engagements. Essential to that self is a 
particular historical depth: one’s institutions, one’s projects, one’s innermost 
desires and concerns, all have a historical valence.13 History is here in the 
service of life,14 if that is understood as the idea of giving vivacity to one’s 
present bodily integrity by embodying it with a depth that reveals how these 
institutions, projects, desires, and aims are mine, mine to the extent that they 
allow me to pursue being me within them. They are thereby shown to be 
hospitable to me, welcoming my projects instead of rejecting them, indeed, 
ultimately welcoming me instead of rejecting me—safety instead of 
annihilation.  
 
Homesickness: Language and World  
Intimately bound up with this point about the ‘ontology’ of existence and 
one’s dependence on having a proper horizon and a proper being-in-the-
world for one’s projects, is also a point about language. As Améry puts it, 
“every language is part of a total reality (Gesamtwirklichkeit) to which one 
must have a well-founded right of ownership if one is to enter the area of 
that language with a good conscience and confident step” (H 53-54). This 
point ought to be understood as point congruous with the sort of claims one 
finds in ordinary language philosophy, especially in the work of 
Wittgenstein and Austin, especially as the two have been inflected by 
Stanley Cavell. As Cavell explores in great depth, it just is the case that: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are 
expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further 
contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in 
particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of 
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rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the 
same projections.15 
It just is the case that words and what they mean, what they fundamentally do, 
changes depending on the context(s) in which they operate. This is the 
significance of Améry’s elaboration of his encounter with the SS guard who 
originated from his regional locale. The inflections, the words, the manner of 
speaking, was, in a deep sense, Améry’s own. He and the guard shared a 
form of life at the most intimate level, and yet, because of the context, it 
forcefully strikes Améry that their words could no longer have the same 
traction they might otherwise have. Language, of course, is in part, about 
words, but it is also dependent on acknowledgment,16 on the complex 
background that allows those words to ‘work,’ on the material conditions of 
existence from moment to moment; in short, on others, for better and for 
worse. This is exactly why Austin speaks of a ‘linguistic phenomenology,’ all 
phenomenology carries a linguistic component, just as any linguistic 
operation betrays a phenomenology.17 Indeed, on this point, compare 
Améry’s claim that “every language is part of a total reality” to Austin’s 
own claim in How to Do Things With Words, that, “the total speech act in the 
total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we 
are engaged in elucidating.”18 
Améry’s point about homesickness is a point about what happens 
when this sense of home—as a phenomenological rootedness in the world, a 
rootedness that depends on all of the complex routes of salience and action 
that make up an individual within a particular world—is destroyed or 
destabilized or shrunken (H52). As he strikingly puts it: 
Faces, gestures, clothes, houses, words (even if I halfway 
understood them) were sensory reality, but not interpretable signs. 
There was no order for me in this world. Was the smile of the 
police official who checked our papers good-natured, indifferent, 
or mocking? Was his deep voice resentful or full of goodwill? I 
didn’t know. Did the old bearded Jew, whose gurgling sounds I 
nevertheless grasped as sentences, mean it well with us or did he 
hate us, because by our mere presence on the streets of the city we 
incited against him the native population, which was already tired 
of foreigners, afflicted by economic troubles and therefore tending 
toward antisemitism? I staggered through a world whose signs 
remained as inscrutable to me as Etruscan script. Unlike the tourist, 
however, for whom such things may be piquant form of alienation, I was 
dependent on this world full of riddles. The man with square skull, the 
police agent with the resentful voice, the gurgling Jew were my 
lords and masters. At times I felt more vulnerable before them than 
before the SS man at home, because of him I had at least known with 
certainty that he was stupid and mean and that he was after my life (H 
47). 
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What’s remarkable about these thoughts is that Améry cuts to the core of the 
homesickness that interests him, and it is not a homesickness that depends 
on anything like hatred or violence (although, of course, it by no means 
excludes such things); instead, the homesickness he describes reveals how 
one’s world becomes impoverished of routes of salience and action. With 
such a reduction in the qualitative richness, and thereby the possibilities, 
that make up a world, one finds a concomitant reduction in the richness of 
one’s self.  
Heidegger describes an entirely analogous phenomenon in his 
1929/1930 lecture courses, when he speaks of a sort of boredom engendered 
in modernity, where “the beings that surround us offer us no further 
possibility of acting and no further possibility of our doing anything.”19 
Earlier in his lectures, Heidegger had noted that in such an experience of 
boredom, “the whole situation and we ourselves as this individual subject 
are thereby indifferent; indeed this boredom does not even let it get to the 
point where such things are of any particular worth…instead it makes 
everything of equally great and equally little worth.”20 In turn, this 
phenomenological experience is entirely analogous to the sort of 
uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) that Heidegger had earlier described in Being 
and Time with the experience of ‘angst,’ where we are ‘fetched’ out of our 
“entangled absorption in the ‘world,’” where our “everyday familiarity” has 
collapsed.21  
Améry’s remarks about temporality ought to be understood in this 
same phenomenological register. Because any particular, present ordinary 
familiarity depends on a certain temporal depth, where one’s projects are 
qualitatively located within a broader web of significance that anchors the 
present to the past, the sort of (forced) exile that Améry describes robs one of 
such depth. As he puts it: “I had no passport, and no past, no money, and no 
history. There was only a line of ancestors, but it consisted of sad landless 
knights, stricken by an anathema. In addition, they had been subsequently 
deprived of their right of residence, and I had to take their ghosts along into 
exile” (H 44). Of course, Améry is not unaware of the possibility of 
immigration, of what “is called finding a new home” (H 47). He is not 
minimizing the possibilities of the/a future.22 He is, however, noting 
difficulties in relying on the future as a means for minimizing the 
phenomenological destruction and alienation that exile breeds. He notes that 
even in the case of such a new home, unless one is exiled as a child (in which 
case one’s ‘world’ is, in many ways, not yet entirely or thoroughly one’s 
own—not yet formed), “penetrating the [new or unfamiliar] signs will be not 
a spontaneous but rather an intellectual act, one combined with a certain 
expenditure of mental effort” (H 48, emphasis added). In this way, no matter 
what one’s comfort or familiarity, indeed even one’s absorption in the land 
to which one is exiled, one will lack a certain qualitative sense of security. As 
Améry puts it, “just as one learns one’s mother tongue without knowing 
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grammar, one experiences one’s native surroundings. Mother tongue and 
native world grow with us, grow into us, and thus become the familiarity that 
guarantees us security” (H 48, emphasis added).  
The extent and nature of this insecurity is entirely proportional to the 
extent and nature of one’s future possibilities (H 58f). This is how to take 
Améry’s remark, as he describes sitting in a deportation train, that, “for even 
if I was not a decipherable past and present, at least I was a future: perhaps a 
man who will kill an SS General, perhaps a worked in New York, a settler in 
Australia, an author in Paris writing in French, the clochard on the Seine 
quay having a good time with his bottle of rotgut” (H58). (Note incidentally 
the extent to which the equation between self and world is inadvertently 
stressed in Améry’s remarks: he was not a decipherable past, not that he ‘did 
not have’ a decipherable past). Améry’s ultimate insight about any futural 
temporality, however, is that “the credit of the person who is aging 
depletes” and “his horizon presses in on him, his tomorrow and day-after-
tomorrow have no vigor (Kraft) and no certainty (Gewißheit)” (H 58). This 
should not be surprising, for even with the possibility of a future, it just is 
the case that any such future depends on a present that is itself available 
only in virtue of a (particular) past. In such a case, the scars of exile are 
omnipresent even if they fade; they leave their mark in the form of lacunae, 
holes of absence and regret, lines of instability, and routes of limitation, 
emptiness, and dead-end. As Améry puts it, in this deeper sense, “there is 
no ‘new home’ … whoever has lost it [a homeland] remains lost himself, 
even if he has learned not to stumble about in the foreign country as if he were 
drunk, but rather to tread the ground with some fearlessness” (H 48, emphasis 
added).23 
This analysis about the impossibility of a novel home might strike one 
as difficult to endorse. After all, don’t immigrants consistently make new 
homes? Indeed, homes which are built on the tail end of the worst possible 
human atrocities and calamities? I do not know how to adjudicate the 
soundness of Améry’s remarks on this point. They likely strike one as 
plausible, or they simply do not: one either feels—no matter how adjusted 
and comfortable a refugee might become—that the world of the refugee 
qualitatively possesses an irredeemable hole that perpetually undermines, at 
least to some extent, any potential project, any future. There just is the 
sadness and the loss that comes with creation of such a new home, in a new 
place. This is what Améry means when he talks about dying “without a 
past,” where an essential element of who one is, in Améry’s words, is 
‘repudiated’ (widerrufen), simply canceled (H 60). In this vein, the soundness 
of Améry’s claims ought to be weighed by a consideration of his—and, in 
fact, any person’s—particular experience of exile and thereby particular 
standpoint.24 
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Conclusion  
Putting the stress on the phenomenology of Améry’s account brings into 
focus another issue that otherwise remains, at best, somewhat mysterious, 
and, at worst, entirely embarrassing: Améry’s invocation of and steadfast 
attachment to the importance of a ‘fatherland’ (Vaterland). Indeed, it is 
exactly because Améry’s approach is phenomenological, and because the 
phenomenological experience in question is not solely restricted to ‘exile’ 
and ‘homesickness,’ but trades also on the experience of loneliness25 and loss 
of sense, that it becomes apparent how Améry’s analysis rests on a deeper 
understanding of home than has been so far suggested. Améry strikingly 
writes that, “home ceases to be home as soon as it is not at the same time 
also (sobald sie nicht zugleich auch) fatherland” (H 55). Of course, given his 
own experiences during the Nazi genocide, Améry is neither crass nor 
sensationalistic about this point: he rejects any extremist understanding of 
this notion in imperialistic terms (H 55) just as vigorously as he rejects any 
abandonment of this notion in favor of cosmopolitanism (H 55-56). How? 
And on what grounds?  
Améry links the experience of “shelter in an autonomous social body 
representing an independent governmental entity” to the experience of a 
fatherland; in turn, the loss of such shelter instantiates homelessness (H 54). 
It is, then, something like this political notion that grounds his 
phenomenological analysis. Putting things in this way, suggests a powerful 
analogy to Hannah Arendt’s work.26 For Arendt, who is also engaged in a 
thoroughly phenomenological project,27 the possibility of the sort of being-
in-the-world upon which Améry’s meditations on home and homesickness 
rest, depend upon human plurality. Such human plurality, in turn, suggests 
the notion of human rights. In other words, human plurality is a condition 
for the existence of a common world, which is itself a requirement for any 
person’s particular being-in-the-world.28 Améry’s invocation of a fatherland 
trades exactly on this point: on such a view, it just is the case that we need 
some political (legal) mechanism to guarantee our home (in the qualitatively 
rich, phenomenological sense outlined above). That, combined with his 
phenomenological reliance on the importance of a home, and the declared 
impossibility of ever gaining a ‘new’ one, leads Améry to link ‘homeland’ 
and ‘fatherland’ in this intimate fashion, with the latter denoting the alleged 
political essence of being-at-home—sociality—as ‘πατρίς’ (patris), fatherland, 
i.e., the origin of patriotism in the experience of being a compatriot. At the 
same time, it still is worth asking why this link ought to be drawn as tightly 
as Améry alleges? Especially, why is it the case that an individual cannot 
feel at home in new place, and thereby adopt a new fatherland? (Surely, this 
is a procedure that Améry—with his new adopted name—was only too 
intimately familiar with, for better and for worse…and so his own judgment 
in this essay, and, grimly, ultimate judgment later in life). 
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In response, Améry marshals two strands of argument, and they each 
point to a still unresolved problem in politics and political theory, a problem 
to which Arendt was especially sensitive and interested in. First, as seen 
already, Améry suggests that, because ‘being-at-home’ is anchored to a 
temporal past vivified by relations of recognition (relations that might be 
cancelled through exile), ‘being-at-home’ is never achieved in the same 
qualitatively rich fashion in a new locale. One is never again ‘at home,’ even 
when comfortable; the achievement always carries an intellectual demand 
that undermines its quality as home (H 48). Second, like Arendt, Améry 
appears to be convinced that such a phenomenological standing, such a 
being-at-home can only be guaranteed through rights that must be enforced 
by the structure of statehood. As Arendt points out, any legal invocation of 
‘human rights’ as a guarantee both arising and flowing from the fact of 
human plurality remains entirely abstract. Rights are only ever actual when 
guaranteed to particular people, within particular contexts; they are never 
abstract. Arendt rightly notes that,  
man had hardly appeared as a completely emancipated, completely 
isolated being who carried his dignity within himself without 
reference to some larger encompassing order, when he disappeared 
again into a member of a people. From the beginning the paradox 
involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it 
reckoned with an “abstract being who seemed to exist nowhere.29 
Exactly because this problem persists to the present day, and exactly because 
we as yet have no mechanism for enforcing rights except within particular 
states, Améry’s analysis, intimately connected to this point about rights, 
remains timely. As Arendt clearly puts it, “the right to have rights, or the 
right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by 
humanity. It is by no means certain whether this is possible.” She continues, 
stressing that, “contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to 
obtain new declarations of human rights from international organizations, it 
should be understood that this idea transcends the present sphere of 
international law which still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and 
treaties between sovereign states; and, for the time being, a sphere that is above 
the nations does not exist.”30 Things have not changed,31 although 
technological advances may augur the possibility of alternative ways of 
organizing ourselves.32 Critically elaborating everything involved in this 
point requires understanding the complex relationship between modern 
conceptions of agency (autonomy) and modern conceptions of how the state 
both forms and guarantees such agency. This is a task that I cannot 
undertake here. I only want to conclude by stressing, as I have throughout, 
that there is a powerful phenomenology of home in Améry’s essay that leads 
us to these questions of agency and statehood. 
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